Until today, an externally imposed epistemological paradigm is dominant in most educational curricula at universities in Africa. Despite ongoing Eurocentrism and Western hegemony in mainstream agricultural trainings in Africa, Indigenous knowledge on agriculture still exists: it has been preserved for generations by farmers and wise elders in rural communities who often are knowledge authorities on African agrarian Indigenous knowledge, values and practices. An imposed epistemological paradigm on the African continent reinforces epistemic injustice by dominating and ignoring Indigenous African ways of (...) doing and knowing, which is deeply dehumanizing. Inspired by Paulo Freire’s ‘humanising pedagogy’ and Mogobe Ramose’s call for mothofatso in human relations, we explore a re-humanising pedagogy for African agrarian philosophy, which addresses the following questions: Can African agrarian philosophy contribute to re-humanization by reviving and restoring Indigenous agricultural knowledge, values and practices? If so, what pedagogy and educational methods are appropriate? In search for answers to these questions, we reflect on a two-week educational program on an endogenous approach to community resilience in Ghana, as a pedagogy that is emerging. In doing so, the chapter is firmly rooted in African soil, both practically—through trainings in Ghana—and theoretically—through African agrarian philosophy. By connecting educational experiences with insights from theory, seven themes for a pedagogy for African agrarian philosophy come to the front: an African agrarian philosophy with memory; a dialogical student–teacher relation; the value of lived experiences; intergenerational and spiritual methods of education; relationality of human beings and Mother Earth; unity between theory and practice; critical consciousness about people’s rights. The thesis defended is that African agrarian philosophy is without relevance if it remains a theoretical exercise that is not developed and put to use with farmers, wise elders and youth in the communities. Instead, when combined with a re-humanising pedagogy, African agrarian philosophy can contribute to reconnecting and reviving African agricultural knowledge, values and practices, which subsequently contributes to transforming African food systems that heals the environment and produces enough food to feed communities. (shrink)

This is a reply to Cees Maris. He wrote two articles in Dutch purporting to be a dialogue with Mogobe Ramose. The two articles have subsequently been compressed into one and published in the South African Journal of Philosophy. Mogobe’s reply is directed at all three articles, meaning the two published in Dutch together with the one published in English. The core of the argument is the meaning of ubu-ntu against ubuntu. The former is a philosophical concept (...) and the latter is the everyday language usage presupposing but not explicitly manifesting awareness of its reliance upon ubu-ntu. In elaborating upon his criticism of some of the writings of Mogobe on “ubuntu”, Maris appeals to other writers to support his position. Mogobe dismisses all this on the ground that neither Maris nor his supporters actually address and challenge the philosophical exposition of ubu-ntu in the various writings of Mogobe. Maris and his supporters have at best looked at Ramose but have not seen him. The result is that there never was “a dialogue” with Ramose, except the imaginary one by Maris. (shrink)

In this essay the question whether or not African philosophy exists is considered through an examination of the meaning of doubt. In St. Augustine and Descartes the basic presupposition with regard to doubt is the indubitable certainty that the doubting subject must exist before there can be any doubt at all. By parity of reasoning, African philosophy must first exist before it can doubt its own existence or be doubted by another. The origin and meaning of the term “Africa” is (...) then examined. This culminates in the thesis that, once the indigenous conquered peoples of the continent choose to retain the term “Africa”, then they are entitled to give content and meaning to it. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.22(2) 2003: 113–127. (shrink)

This article distinguishes between pan-Africanism and pan-Africanness. It argues that the history of pan-Africanism is replete with achievements but that the achievements could have been more and radical if the movement had from its inception adopted pan-Africanness, manifesting itself as ubuntu, as its point of departure. It focuses on epistemic and material injustice and suggests that there cannot be social justice without epistemic justice. The pursuit of the latter ought to lead to giving up one’s life if necessary, for the (...) sake of giving life to others. (shrink)

Modu wa tabaLegae ke karolo ye botlhokwa ya setshaba. Tabakgolo mo taodishong ye ke go araba potjisho ye: na ke tshwanelo gore bana ba ishe batswadi ba bona kgole kua madulong a batsofe? Re araba potjisho ye ka go ganetja bana ba ba phedilego gabotse basa babjwe go isha batswadi mafelong a botsofe. Re tloga re bontsha le gore kgale-kgale gona mafatsheng a Bodikela gobe go na le motlhalefi bare ke Cicero. Le yena o kwana le kganetjo ye moka le (...) moreti mogolo John Milton. Botee magareng ga bao ba phelago, badimo le bao ba sa tlo belegwa bo a senyega ge bana ba isha batswadi madulong a batsofe.AbstractTaking the African conception of community as our point of departure, we argue that the advancing age of parents is no justification for their children to transfer the responsibility of caring for their parents to others, such as to nursing homes. Usefulness is not the defining feature of the worth of an elderly human being, especially a parent. We will show by appeal to Cicero that this understanding was alive in Western antiquity and was upheld in the modern period by, for example, John Milton the poet. To send one’s parents to a nursing home when one is in good health is to destroy and kill the triangular relationship between parents and children. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafe Dinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho, morafe ke yo tee fela; ke morafe wa batho. Ya go bitjwa DNA ka Sekgowa e laetja go sena pelaelo gore batho kamoka ke bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee. Ka bjalo, morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao. Bophelong bja ka metlha re bona gore ba gona bao ba gananago le taba ye. (...) Ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi. Go ya ka bona, merafe ye e a fapafapana ebile tlhago e laetja gore go nale merafe ya kua godimo le ya kua fase. Go nale merafe yewe e tlhabologilego le ye esa tlhabologang. Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo. Ke yona e tlholago dintwa. E ganana le phedisano yeo e ithekgilego godimo ga toka le khutjo magareng ga batho. Ka fao taodiso ye e shireletja maemo a gore go nale morafe yo tee fela; morafe yo ebego lelapa le tee fela la batho kamoka. [Race is an indivisible singular but practice insists it is a frangible plural Biological anthropology suggests that there is only one human race. Studies of the DNA have confirmed that there is only one human family marked by a variety of differences such as the type of hair, the color of eyes and skin. Instead of accepting the scientific finding that the human race is one, humanity is involved in an absurd but deadly race to prove that there are many races arising from a preestablished ontological hierarchy. According to this imaginary hierarchy, races are graded on a scale of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization” and “barbarism.” The thesis defended in this article is that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations. The human race is an indivisible singular and not a frangible plural.]. (shrink)

The sheer variety of socio-political events and technological advancements which affect modern society, and the speed and intensity at which these events occur around the world, delivers change known as epistemic and social transformation. Within this context, the question of justice for all is a poignant one. It is a cognitive revolution challenging humankind to consider whether or not the already contested meaning of philosophy can remain unchanged. The contributions to _Contrasts and contests about philosophy_ address this challenge from a (...) variety of different, and even contending, perspectives. This book was originally published as a special issue of the _South African Journal of Philosophy. _. (shrink)

Professor Heinz Kimmerle encountered African philosophy at a time when his specialisation in the philosophy of Hegel had attained world recognition. For Hegel, African philosophy did not exist in Sub-Saharan Africa, exactly the area in which Kimmerle made his first contact with African philosophy. Hegel¿s philosophy was not a stranger to Sub-Saharan Africa. This was because the Western educational paradigm was imposed upon the conquered, colonized peoples during the period of colonisation. Unlike Hegel, Kimmerle took African philosophy seriously and engaged, (...) initially, in dialogues with African philosophy. Out of the unfolding dialogues grew intercultural philosophy spearheaded by Kimmerle¿s penetrating, insightful and incisive critique of some of the fundamental presuppositions of Hegel¿s philosophy. The essays contained in this book focus on the evolution of Kimmerle¿s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. Underlying this are recognition and respect for other modes of doing philosophy as manifestations of intercultural philosophy. To deny dialogues, if you prefer, polylogue among world philosophies, is to reject the very basis of philosophy. Thus a crucial dimension of philosophy would be precluded, which can be found in this book, namely, the critical evaluation of Kimmerle¿s conception and meaning of intercultural philosophy. (shrink)

This article discusses critically the problems and significance of the concepts of reincarnation and the resurrection. It focuses on the contemporary debate on this topic between Robert Almeder and Stephen Hales. The Akan understanding of these concepts is invoked showing the contrast and,even comparison between the African and the Western understanding of the concepts. It is suggested in this article that the arguments for these concepts could still be ameliorated. This point is taken up by Ramose’s focus on the (...) issues that arise from the critical discussion. Ramose points out that the concept of immortality requires a special place in the discussion since it is the axis around which both reincarnation and resurrection revolve. He complements the discussion accordingly. He further argues that the topic is as relevant today as it was since the dawn of humankind. Any attempt to exclude or discard the topic from philosophy is both questionable and an arbitrary limitation of the scope and meaning of philosophy.2 Keywords: ‘God’, ‘the soul’, immortality, reincarnation, resurrection, the body. (shrink)

This Special Issue comes at a time when African countries and the Global South in general are facing unprecedented crises in securing energy to power their economies. The crises are necessitated largely by the developed Western countries exerting enormous power and pressure upon the developing world to move away from fossil fuels, while at the same time the West is increasing its uptake on fossils. However, with critical self-reflection we are able to understand that a crisis of this nature is (...) not without historical precedence, as it is preceded by a series of other forms of injustices meted out upon the formerly and still colonized peoples. And not long ago, the COVID-19 pandemic on the health front, and the handling thereof, showed just how skewed and divided the world still is and laid bare race-laden inequalities both at local and global levels. So to be sure, the current crises are part of the history of struggle against race-based social injustices and demonstrate Western desire to continue its stranglehold over its former colonies. And although the energy transition is dubbed the “Just Energy Transition,” for those in the developing world who are negatively affected, there is clearly nothing “Just” about it. So whereas we generally tend to speak of social or historical injustices such as the energy crises and COVID-19, at an epistemological front we find cognitive injustice. Accordingly, the articles in this issue contribute to a series of responses by the anticolonial movement (broadly defined) in relation to injustice, particularly its epistemological ramifications on knowledge and knowledge production in the relation between the colonizer and the colonized, the center and the periphery. Furthermore, the historical exclusion of African and other non-European peoples from participation in reason had the effect that Africans in particular were precluded from philosophy itself, a phenomenon that African philosophy and associated disciplines are today still grappling with in the academy. So in a word, the articles make an important contribution insofar as reckoning with the impact that race and the history of racism has had in philosophy in particular, both as a discipline and as a human mental activity.It should be remembered that the exclusion of Africans from reason and eventually from philosophy is preceded by an earlier one, the exclusion of Africans from recognition at a human level, qua rational beings. One can talk of a history of depersonalizations and dehumanizations; of massacres and deracination inflicted upon the oppressed owing to the colonial encounter. This is why for a scholar and a philosopher of the periphery, to use Enrique Dussel’s term, philosophical inquiry cannot and ought not be divorced from human reality. In fact, scholars of the periphery often stress the need for philosophy not to abstract too much from reality; and for philosophy to confine itself with liberatory human ends, among other things. There are a number of thinkers of the periphery who famously harp upon this point. For instance, Lewis Gordon has introduced the concept of “disciplinary decadence” by which he laments the fetishization of methods and whereby disciplines become an end in themselves, thus not necessarily serving human needs. Other thinkers in this school of thought include the likes of Enrique Dussel, Charles Mills, Cornel West, Angela Davis, and George Yancy to mention but a few. Yancy speaks of the “Density project” with which he has a normative injunction upon Black philosophers. In a similar vein, Dussel remarks in the Philosophy of Liberation that “Philosophy, when it is really philosophy and not sophistry or ideology, does not ponder philosophy. It does not ponder philosophical texts, except as a pedagogical propaedeutic to provide itself with interpretive categories. Philosophy ponders the nonphilosophical; the reality.”1 This reality, as is averred, is in existential phenomenology, not merely objective reality or perhaps something out there existing on its own accord, but rather it is what Jean-Paul Sartre associates with “human reality,” which is reality as lived by people of flesh and blood. So in a world demarcated between center and periphery, human beings and subhumans, whites and Blacks, the anticolonial thinker cannot afford not to raise questions relating to social existence, “the reality.” Thus for those in the academy, one must be able to come to terms with the reality of non-Western and “non-scientific knowledges” (after Boaventura De Sousa Santos) not being recognized as credible knowledge, coupled with the possibility of being forgotten, of being completely wiped out from history. And, as we see with Bernard Matolino’s article in particular, this is the battle that African philosophy has vigorously had to deal with in the previous two or three decades.In the Western canon, philosophy is generally taken to begin with the Greeks and this, as is observed, is no historical accident but forms part of a project to relegate previous philosophical traditions to relative obscurity, and to preclude the rest of humanity from participation in reason. The idea is that for Western modernity to be a viable project, oppressed cultures must out of necessity be denied reason. On this very point, Frantz Fanon would remark in Black Skin White Masks in the following manner: “That victory [on the rational front] played cat and mouse; it made a fool of me. As the other put it, when I was present, it was not; when it was there, I was no longer.”2 In this regard Mogobe Ramose’s article notes how the Aristotlean concept of man as a rational animal becomes a misnomer insofar as this relates to the Black person. With this sleight of hand, previous civilizations such as the African (Egyptian) and Arab traditions in philosophy are supposed to vanish from history and from the epistemological landscape. In this regard, Mills’s insights will continue to haunt philosophy well into the future, long after his passing. Mills had noted that a typical philosophy program in the Westernized university will normally start off with the two Greek philosophers, namely Plato and Aristotle. From here it moves to cover the Middle Ages and probably end with theories on liberalism. And although this period covers a history of more than two thousand years of Western philosophy, there will be little or no mention of traditions that shaped philosophical thought prior to the Greeks.The above notwithstanding, the articles in this issue show, however, that not only are Africans and oppressed peoples endowed with reflective reason, but that they also possess a unique brand of philosophy. By and large, the articles not only affirm the epistemological standpoint of African philosophy but show its own genealogy, discourse, and objectives among other things.With these short remarks, the following articles cut across these thematic areas: metaphysics of race, epistemic racism, racial ontology, feminism, and decolonial literature. Accordingly, the article by Bernard Matolino begins by delving into the metaphysics of race and notes that while there is no proof that there are distinct races (after Kwame Appiah), race as a matter of social life is alive and relevant. Further, his article goes on to demonstrate how African philosophy emerged as a form of protest and native philosophers’ need to show that indigenous peoples always had a philosophy. In a similar vein, Edwin Etieyibo’s article discusses epistemic racism, and how color prejudice historically translated to other forms of racial injustices such as epistemic racism. His article makes use of the works of such thinkers as Anibal Quijano and Ramon Grosfoguel to trace the genealogy of such injustices in the modern period.Siphiwe Ndlovu’s article looks into the problem of Black marginality, particularly in the modern period. He locates his musings within the social contract tradition but suggests a reading of contemporary marginality through the lens of Mills’s racial contract. Accordingly, instead of seeing Black marginality as a function of exclusion or being cast outside the contract, the article argues that such marginality is due not from exclusions per se but rather from inclusion albeit only as junior—and therefore inferior—partners in the racial contract.Mogobe Ramose’s article begins by endorsing Kwasi Wiredu’s view that there is nothing wrong with African philosophy being preoccupied with questions that are not exactly identical to those of non-African philosophies. Furthermore, his article traces, through D. M. Goldenberg, the roots of anti-Black racism from “colour symbolism” among the Arabs in the classical world, through the Rabbinic era, and later taking the form of race prejudice in Christianity. At the crux of his article is the argument that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations.The article by Zinhle ka’Nobuhlaluse considers Anika Mann’s arguments on race and feminist standpoint as an existential standpoint and foundation. She takes up Mamphela Ramphele’s initial autobiography, Mamphela Ramphele: A Life, to critically reflect on what the actions of “non-subservient Blackwomen” reveal about the lived experience of being Black and a woman under Apartheid South Africa.The article by Siseko Kumalo infuses decolonial and literary criticism as projects that may allow for a recognition of the “ontological legitimacy” of amaqaba (those who rejected colonial influences and education). Through a close reading of S. E. K. Mqhayi’s Intshayelelo: Imbali, the article engages with the question How does a model of inclusive national identity in South Africa, once established, get us to the point of recognition for the Indigene? (shrink)

This article discusses two complementary themes that play an important role in contemporary South African political philosophy: (1) the racist tradition in Western philosophy; and (2) the role of ubuntu in regaining an authentic African identity, which was systematically suppressed during the colonial past and apartheid. These are also leading themes in Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. The first part concentrates on John Locke. It discusses the thesis that the reprehensible racism of many founders of liberal political (...) philosophy has lethally infected liberal theory. This view neglects the distinction between genesis and justification. Political liberalism has since cleansed itself of the prejudices of its spiritual ancestors. Liberal human rights exclude racism as a matter of principle. The second part discusses the claim that the ubuntu philosophy provides a better basis for a constitution in a modern society than political liberalism. A major problem is that ubuntu is an essentially contested concept. Some philosophers consider ubuntu to be a moribund notion (Matolino); others see it as a vital concept par excellence. In the latter case, it is elaborated from sundry incompatible political views, ranging from African nationalism (Ramose) via humanist communitarianism (Metz) to liberalism (Mboti). Conclusion: as an essentially contested ideological concept, ubuntu should not be a decisive constitutional standard for the application of state force. In contrast, the constitutional model of political liberalism provides a reasonable alternative, as it is designed precisely to solve the problem of social plurality and ideological contest. (shrink)

Based on the ideas of two main representatives of the academic discourse on Ubuntu, Michael O. Eze and Mogobe B. Ramose, the paper shows how the concept of Ubuntu can contribute to transcending conventional concepts of cosmopolitanism. Referring to the concept of Ubuntu, Ramose and Eze criticize ‘Western’ concepts of cosmopolitanism because they always seem to start from binary oppositions (‘I’ and ‘other’), which must be reconciled. ‘Western’ cosmopolitanism continues to build on boundaries (nations, cultures, etc.) that (...) constitute communities and exclude the ‘other’. Here the boundary remains a place of exclusion. Therefore, it is necessary to conceptualize categories such as ‘boundary’ and the ‘Other’ in a different way. Ubuntu as a concept where the human being is essentially a relational being (one who exists in and through relationships) seems to offer an alternative in the sense of a ‘critical’ (Mignolo, 2002a) or ‘emancipatory’ cosmopolitanism. (Pieterse, 2006; Ngcoya, 2015). (shrink)

In this article, I respond to questions about, and criticisms of, my article “Towardan African Moral Theory” that have been put forth by Allen Wood, Mogobe Ramose, Douglas Farland and Jason van Niekerk. The major topicsI address include: what bearing the objectivity of moral value should have on cross-cultural moral differences between Africans and Westerners; whether a harmonious relationship is a good candidate for having final moral value; whether consequentialism exhausts the proper way to respond to the value (...) of a harmonious relationship; what makes a moral theory count as “African”; how the existing literature on African ethics relates to the aim of analytically developing and defending a single foundational moral principle; whether the intuitions I appeal to ground an African moral theory are pro tanto rightmakers or general moral truths; whether the moral theory I defend can capture pro tanto rightness; and whether the best interpretation of African ethics is self-regarding (deeming the only basic moral reason for action to be that it would develop one's own valuable human nature) or other-regarding (holding that a certain kind of harmonious relationship between individuals could ground a basic moral reason for action) . (shrink)

Contemporary African philosophy ranges over a number of debates, positions, and theoretical traditions. It can, however, be read as its own critical tradition of hard-won methodological refinements and substantive philosophical debates common to a body of philosophical work concerned with African philosophical resources elided by coloniality and postcoloniality. In this paper I argue for an account of Analytic philosophy as a style of philosophy, and trace a congruous approach in history of African philosophy, suggesting that these should not be characterised (...) as antagonistic. I conclude by contrasting this style of philosophy with positions drawn from the work of Mogobe Ramose, arguing that the Analytic approach captures a set of questions worth pursuing in engagements with Ramose's work. (shrink)

Neste artigo apresentamos uma perspectiva de compreensão da história da filosofia, na qual é possível acessar outros modos de como essa história pode ser interpretada. Nesta perspectiva ocorre a desconstrução epistêmica eurocentrada de legitimação da ideia de um “milagre” grego que permite o surgimento da filosofia nessa região em detrimento a outros lugares. O pressuposto indicado é o da pluriversalidade de Mogobe Ramose (2011) que apresenta a ideia de pensamento reflexivo e crítico como condição humana, independente de local. (...) Em relação ao continente africano trazemos a crítica de que a escravidão moderna promovida pela Europa desumanizou africanos e indígenas e, com isso, lhes nega a capacidade de pensamento. Após essa análise, apresentamos a filosofia afro-brasileira como um desdobramento da filosofia africana em seu deslocamento do continente africano para as Américas no período da escravidão e colonização. Apresentamos as bases epistêmicas dessa filosofia mantidas nas culturas afro-brasileiras. Destacamos, também, os seus subsídios corporais, salientando a sua dimensão ética e estética ao propor outros modos de se relacionar em que o coletivo é a alternativa ao individualismo, no qual se destaca uma ética comunitária e solidária. As narrativas constituídas no processo colonizador da modernidade são revistas em seus pressupostos de supremacia para dar lugar a uma filosofia que alcance o outro, que se estabeleça na alteridade. Tal proposta nos parece relevante para o ensino formal de filosofia, pois dialoga diretamente com a realidade de mundo existencial formativa do país, e aponta outras possibilidades de organização da vida em distintos aspectos, mas todos eles perpassados pela educação, neste caso, uma educação para ser e estar com o outro, o que solicita a revisão curricular na grade da filosofia, tanto na formação de professores quanto na disciplina destinada ao ensino médio. (shrink)

This article explores the distinction between anti-colonial longing and postcolonial becoming through a commentary on Antjie Krog’s Begging to Be Black. The epistemology and ontology of postcolonial becoming is the central concern. Begging to Be Black is a mytho-poetic narrative in which a world is imagined where King Moshoeshoe, missionaries from the 19th century, Antjie Krog and her friends and colleagues, ANC cadres, the Deleuzian philosopher Paul Patton, Nelson Mandela, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and the ANC Youth League are placed in (...) the same narrative space where they can intermingle. And this is done to respond to a crisis of the present — the difficulties South Africans face in grappling with the legacies of colonialism and Apartheid, and the fact that there is a process of un-homing and re-homing that Krog feels white South Africans in particular need to think about more deeply. The article compares Krog’s approach to decolonization with that of the leading South African philosopher of ubuntu, Mogobe Ramose. Both Krog and Ramose offer the epistemological and ontological resources for grappling with the relationship between past, present and future in a decolonizing setting. The article examines how postcolonial critique may take place through liminal figures. Liminality is characterized as central to postcolonial becoming. (shrink)

Communitarianism has been the dominant disposition of many African scholars towards ubuntu. The nature of the concept somewhat limits how one can theorise about ubuntu. However, I argue that there is still a lot more that can be harnessed from the ubuntu concept, especially as it pertains to the ontology of radical escape. I use radical escape as an ontological character of every human being whereby to exist is to escape. In this paper, I argue that ubuntu does not provide (...) the possibility for radical escape. The nature of escape that ubuntu provides is limited to the confines of its communitarian outlook. In this paper, I bring on board the works of Mogobe Ramose, Thaddeus Metz, Kwame Gyekye, Emmanuel Levinas, and Thomas Lear, among others, to substantiate my position. I hope to demonstrate the need to accommodate the concept of radical escape in theorising about ubuntu. (shrink)

In "Actualism or Possibilism?" (Philosophical Studies, 84 (2-3), December 1996), James Tomberlin develops two challenges for actualism. The challenges are to account for the truth of certain sentences without appealing to merely possible objects. After canvassing the main actualist attempts to account for these phenomena, he then criticizes the new conception of actualism that we described in our paper "In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic" (Philosophical Perspectives 8: Philosophy of Logic and Language, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1994). We respond (...) to Tomberlin's criticism by showing that we wouldn't analyze the problematic claim (e.g., "Ponce de Leon searched for the fountain of youth") in the way he suggests. (shrink)

Current thinking and research on consciousness and the brain.

The scholastic philosopher is interested in definition for a different reason than the lexicographer and linguist. The philosopher is trying to learn things. Fe defines, after investigating reality, in an attempt to describe reality clearly and to sum up some aspect of his understanding of reality. Hence, we find our scholastic philosophers adopting as a main feature of their method this insistence on defining, on precise and detailed explanation of their definitions, and on proving that their definitions da correctly express (...) what a nature or activity is. A dictionary of the language of scholastic philosophy fitted to the needs of beginners and of undergraduate students of the subject is not available in English. (shrink)

No detailed description available for "Natural and Conventional Meaning".

This work considers the consequences for political philosophy of what contemporary philosophers have called the end, or closure, especially in the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger.

The renowned Christian theologian Bernard Lonergan was also a professor, teaching courses on theological method at universities in Canada, the United States, and Italy. This volume records his lectures and teaching materials, thus preserving and elucidating his intellectual development between the publication of Insight in 1957 and Method in Theology in 1972. The present volume contains a record of the lectures delivered in 1962, 1964, and 1968. This is the most 'interactive' volume yet published in the Collected Works series. (...) The audio recordings of the 1962 and 1968 lectures are now available on the website www.bernardlonergan.com, as are PDF files of original papers from his 1964 institute at Georgetown. These lectures help to elucidate the development of Lonergan's ideas on such key notions as horizon, conversion, and meaning, as well as his evolving opinion on how best to divide theology into fields of specialization. (shrink)